

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

TS 770243

November 14, 1977

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
#3200B

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on Indian Ocean Arms Control

Attached are the approved minutes of the SCC Meeting on Indian Ocean Arms Control of November 9th for your information.

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

NSC review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010051-5

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING

November 9, 1977

Time and Place: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m., WH Situation Room

Subject: Indian Ocean Arms Control

Participants:

State:

Warren Christopher
Jerome Kahan

CIA:

Robert Bowie ✓

25X1

Defense:

David McGiffert
Lynn Davis

White House:

Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)

NSC:

Reginald Bartholomew
James Thomson
Gary Sick (Notetaker)

JCS:

Lt. Gen. William Smith

ACDA:

Paul Warnke
John Newhouse

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

In preparation for the third round of discussions with the USSR on Indian Ocean arms limitations scheduled for December 1-10, 1977, in Bern, Switzerland, the SCC reviewed the following issues:

1. US Objective in the Next Round. Mr. Warnke felt that the best we could expect from this round would be a bracketed text of a draft agreement, with a further round required to achieve agreement. He could foresee the following round might be in February. Dr. Brzezinski noted that it may not be in our interest to push too fast. All agreed.

2. Working Group Recommendations. The working group recommended positions on Allies and Adjacent Areas, Aircraft Carriers, Communications Facilities, Facilities on the Seabed, Soviet Air Capable Ships, and Soviet Reaction to the Presence of US carriers were accepted by the SCC. The position on SSBNs was changed to read as follows: "We have determined that we will not specifically ban SSBNs from the area." It was agreed in any event that SSBN transits would be permitted as a minimum.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

XGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority of
Z. Brzezinski; Exemption Category
Section 5(B)(3).

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010051-5

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010051-5

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

-2-

3. Form of the Agreement. State, JCS and Defense supported Option A, the exchange of unilateral statements of past activities in the Indian Ocean as supplement to the General Declaration. Mr. Warnke argued that there was no substantial difference between Options A and B. Whether we decide on past tense or future tense, unilateral statements or a protocol, signed or unsigned, in fact the effect is to create future obligations which are binding. Mr. Warnke was concerned that some latitude be left to conclude joint protocols on at least certain issues, such as definition of the area. Several members noted that a joint protocol would require both sides to accept statements about bases that might be unacceptable. Others noted that a Soviet statement that they have never operated any bases in the Indian Ocean would be unacceptable, even in a unilateral statement, since we would still have to agree to it and answer to Congress. Dr. Brzezinski stated that any appended statement should say what is precluded by the agreement, rather than what has happened in the past. All agreed that we should remain flexible on this issue for the next round.

4. Level of Port Activity. All agreed, after considerable discussion, that the US should continue to insist on distinguishing between "usage" and "port visits" in order to prevent the USSR from expanding the type of operations they now conduct at Berbera to a number of other ports on the littoral. However, it was also agreed that the Soviets should be able to shift their Berbera operations to a different port in the event they lose access to Somali facilities. They should not, however, be permitted to construct new facilities for the primary use of their own forces. The delegation has latitude in the next round to develop workable definitional distinctions between "usage" and "port visits."

5. Supreme Interest Clause. All agreed that the US should continue to insist that either side may invoke supreme national interest to withdraw from the agreement without any advance notification period. Mr. Warnke noted that this agreement is qualitatively different from SALT and other agreements where we have accepted a period of advance notification. However, the lack of notification will be difficult to negotiate and will make the Soviets place additional emphasis on the importance of US activities in adjacent areas.

6. Submarine Support Facilities. All agreed that the US should press for a ban on all submarine support activities and construction in the Indian Ocean area, including sub tenders. Mr. Warnke felt that we might have to fall back on this at some point. Mr. Christopher agreed, and noted that this provision would force the Soviets to change their present pattern of deploying sub tenders to the area. He was particularly concerned that this might lead the Soviets to request a comparable cutback on our part, e.g. our carrier deployments, which would be a bad trade. Dr. Brzezinski noted that we would have time to review the issue again in the event we had to fall back to a lesser option.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010051-5

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010051-5

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

-3-

7. Definition of the Area. All agreed to hold to the previous US position. Dr. Brzezinski suggested exploring the possibility of a compromise position on the waters south of Australia at approximately 130 degrees longitude, which would include additional ocean area but no significant Australian ports.

8. Construction at Diego Garcia. All agreed to hold to the previous US position that stabilization would include the completion of planned construction. It was recalled that the Presidential Directive issued prior to the last round called for the SCC to be notified by DoD well in advance of developments on Diego Garcia which could have a significant impact on the negotiating process. Defense noted that the runway is being constructed in successive longitudinal strips and that one of these was already in place for the entire 12,000 foot length. Defense will continue to keep the SCC informed.

9. Linkage Between Stabilization and Negotiations on Reductions. All agreed that we should be prepared to begin negotiations on reductions within three months after a stabilization agreement comes into effect.

10. Carrier Deployments. Mr. Warnke noted that the present wording of our assurance on carrier deployments would permit a carrier to accompany all three task force deployments. In fact, we have in the past deployed two, but not three, carriers in a single year. He proposed that our statement be revised to indicate that our past pattern of task group deployments has included at least one carrier and as many as two in any one year. All agreed.

23.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010051-5

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET
--	--------------	--	--------------	--	--------

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/NFAC	X			
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					
11					
12					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

For info and any further appropriate distribution.

16 November 77

Date

3637 (10-77)

25X1

MSC

(EX-100)

TOP SECRET

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE NSC	CIA CONTROL NO. TS 770243
DOC. NO.	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 16 Nov 1977
DOC. DATE 14 Nov 1977	LOGGED BY ER/LR
COPY NO. 1 #3 Sub B	
NUMBER OF PAGES 1 (4t)	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS One	

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

[illegible]

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
BY (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010051-5

(40)